ture from Outer Eurasia) well into the seventeenth century. Yet, as early as the latter half of the fi fteenth century, Muscovy began to adopt material culture and administrative practices from the west (western Outer Eurasia). Somewhat paradoxically, however, many of the inventions and innovations that Muscovy/Russia adopted from the western end of Outer Eurasia had their origins at the eastern end.
Much of the study of Russian history in the early modern period has been focused on -modernization.‖ Russia is often presented as being behind Europe in historical development, and insofar as Russia -Europeanizes,‖ it is considered to be modernizing. As a result, Peter is seen as the great modernizer because he is the great Europeanizer. Other historians have questioned this approach as misrepresentative. Daniel Clark Waugh has argued that -to emphasize modernization under Peter may be a greater distortion of reality than the reverse.‖ 65 Furthermore, Waugh points to -three tendencies‖ in the historiography that are of concern to him: -the continuing focus on the center (and thus on Petrine pronouncements) as opposed to the provinces (arguably the locus of Russian realities); the concomitant emphasis on the elite as opposed to the mass of the population; and the emphasis on secularization, to the extent that religious belief and practice are ignored.‖ 7 Waugh suggests that, taken as a whole, Russia remained more traditional than modern even after Peter's reign, and he draws on Bruno Latour's ideas about the insuffi ciencies of modernization theory. But even before Latour, Marion J. Levy Jr., had questioned whether we can consider modernization to have emerged fullfl edged before the nineteenth century precisely because modernization is based on increasing interdependency. In 1972, Levy wrote: -Modernization is no more than 150 years old by anyone's estimate.‖ 98 Simon Dixon in his application of the -modernisation model‖ to analyze Russian developments from 1676 to 1825 found that it had -limited applicability‖ and that -Russia in 1825 was by no means a modern state.‖
The meaning of the term modernization itself depends on the standpoint of the person using it. As such, it can be used in two broad senses: relative to the time, in the sense of adopting then state-of-the-art innovations; and relative to the present. In the fi rst sense, insofar as medieval Europe adopted the stirrup (eighth century), crossbows (eleventh century), paper (twelfth century), gunpowder (thirteenth century), and guns (fourteenth century), it was modernizing according to the Chinese standard. Muscovy, in turn, modernized when it adopted military weaponry, strategy, and tactics, as well as certain administrative techniques from the Mongols in the fourteenth and fi fteenth centuries.10 Insofar as Muscovy/Russia was borrowing whatever the advanced innovations of the time were, it was modernizing from the fourteenth century on.
A present-oriented view of modernization, in contrast, would call a state -modern‖ when it developed or was well on its way to developing each of the following eight characteristics: a competitive spirit; widespread literacy; constitutionalism; the implementation of scientifi c thinking (the -spirit of number and reason‖); secularization of social practices; nationalism (including ethnic and racial equality); industrialization and the accompanying urbanization; and gender equality. In that sense, then, particular states are only more or less -modern,‖ and most of Europe was not -modern‖ until the second half of the twentieth century. One of the problems with using the term modernization is that the two senses are often merged, so that particular institutions of a premodern country are evaluated as more or less modern, not in relation to its contemporaries, but in terms of where its contemporaries would be later or even are in the present. 11Although early modern societies may not have had the interdependency that Levy saw as characterizing modern societies, they were interconnected, as Joseph Fletcher pointed out, during the period from 1500 to 1800.12 He proposed a terminological framework for studying and analyzing that interconnectedness consisting of four aspects: interconnection, -historical phenomena in which there is contact linking two or more societies‖; horizontal continuity, -an economic, social or cultural historical phenomenon experienced by two or more societies between which there is not necessarily interconnection‖ but that -must result from the same ultimate source‖; vertical continuity, -survival of institutions, patterns, and the like through time‖ in a society; parallel events, some event that does not have an ultimate common source, such as possibly population loss or gain, occurring more or less simultaneously in two societies that do not have contact.13 In addition, he used the device of an imaginary airplane that could travel back in time and -circle the globe,‖ but this plane would not allow us to do so on any particular day. Instead, it would compel us -to see the image of the world superimposed upon itself a thousand times, day after day, for the three centuries (sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth) of early modern history,‖ which in turn would allow us to discern -general patterns‖ and parallels. Among the parallels Fletcher discerned are: population growth; quickening tempo; growth of -regional‖ cities and towns; rise of urban commercial classes; religious revival and missionary movements; rural unrest; and decline of nomadism. For one thing, such cognition tells us that we may be doing a disservice to our evidence by attempting to interpret it in terms of some kind of turning or acceleration of Russian historical development around 1700. The -Peter changed everything‖ school of historiography may be minimizing the vertical (diachronic) continuities of Russian history, while the -Peter sped things up‖ school may be minimizing the horizontal (synchronic) continuities of Muscovite/Russia with the rest of Afro-Eurasia. Instead of minimizing what came before Peter and seeing Russia as signifi cantly different after Peter, or using modern societies as the standard by which to judge early modern Russia, a better approach might be to evaluate all of Russian and Afro-Eurasian history on the same basis and place it on the same analytical grid. One may then see that the -turning point‖ (the continental divide) in Russian history comes in the early nineteenth century, not the early eighteenth. In that sense, the -long eighteenth century‖ in Russia is really part of a continuum that goes back to the late fi fteenth century.
The year -1800‖ is admittedly an arbitrary and fuzzy cutoff. Some areas show defi nite changes before 1800; others not until after. Muscovy/Russia remained -traditional‖ in outlook and function through the eighteenth century. Between 1450 and 1800, there are no turning points, just more or less continuous trends (micro-changes with velocity). Only at the beginning of the nineteenth century does that traditional outlook begin to end and then initially only among the ruling class. My argument for circa 1800 as the -end‖ of Muscovy, however, is not based so much on outlook (a diffi cult determination at best) as on the following eight categories of historical development.
1. Contact with the world. Although it might be claimed that Muscovy's contacts with western and southern Outer Eurasia before Peter could be considered sporadic, the same might be said about Russia's contacts in the eighteenth century. To be sure, one can fi nd more examples of contacts with western Outer Eurasia (i.e., Europe) in the eighteenth century than in the seventeenth, and more in the seventeenth than in the sixteenth, and so forth. But this represents only an increasing involvement with western Outer Eurasia rather than a sudden and dramatic -turn to the west‖ at any specifi c point. Middle and late Muscovy was in more or less continuous dialogue with European countries. By the early nineteenth century, however, Russia's contacts with Europe were becoming qualitatively integrated or, to use Levy's term, interdependent. Russian elite did not think of Russia as an empire until well into the nineteenth century, and most of the rest of the population did not think of themselves as being part of -Russia‖ until the twentieth century. During Peter's reign, instead of an acceleration, we see a deceleration in the rate of territorial acquisition. If we count Peter's reign as beginning in 1696, when he assumed real power, we obtain a territorial acquisition fi gure of 18,933 square kilometers per year (it is lower if we count from 1682). From 1505 to 1682, Muscovy acquired, on average, 70,734.79 square kilometers per year. And from 1725 to 1800, it was 39,687.43 square kilometers per year. The high territorial acquisition rate before Peter can be attributed to the conquest of Siberia, how is the high acquisition rate after Peter (more than twice as much per year on average as during Peter's reign) to be explained? The numbers in themselves do not mean much and should not be overemphasized, but the comparisons do raise questions concerning the claims that Peter founded the Russian empire or that he was an -empire builder.‖ Peter is responsible, though, for changing the name of the country offi cially to -the Russian empire.‖ 3. Court politics. As Muscovy expanded, it needed a formal means of incorporating the nobility of newly acquired territories into the ruling class. From the fi fteenth through the eighteenth centuries, court politics was conducted in much the same way with the prominent families and clans dominating positions in the government. Court politics throughout this period was not issue or policy driven.1514 Instead it consisted of the personal relations of the greater and lesser ruling families. A family could rise in status, power, and wealth for a number of reasons, including as Robert O. Crummey stated, -talent, energy, ambition, or good luck,‖ by -marrying into the royal family,‖ or if -one of their family members became a celebrated military leader.‖ 16 Yet, families could just as quickly fall from status. In order to confi rm a family's change in status and, thus, to maintain and even expand their position, families had to play the marriage politics game well. As Russell Martin argues in another contribution to this forum, all that changed with the Succession Law of 1797.
It may seem counterintuitive to argue that the eighteenth century in Russia was no more different from the seventeenth than the seventeenth was from the sixteenth. After all, with a Renaissance aesthetic in art and European aristocratic style in dress, language, and facial hair confi gurations on men along with powdered wigs, was Russian court culture not more -European‖ in the eighteenth century? Yet, the deep-structural power relations remained the same. Although the court elite took on the maskirovka of European style and speech, its behaviors and attitudes were consistent with those of Russian courts of preceding centuries. 174. Military. Through the sixteenth century, the Muscovite military was based on the steppe model with emphasis on cavalry, quick movement, and fl exible tactics. Such practices worked well in the steppe. But as Russia came increasingly into contact with the European-type infantry army of Sweden and the cavalry of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, European-type infantry and cavalry formations, fi rearms, and tactics were adopted to battle those armies. As early as the middle of the sixteenth century, Muscovy had established a standing unit of infantry, the musketeers (called the streltsy -shooters‖). -Europeanizing‖ the army had begun in the early part of the seventeenth century under Tsar Mikhail (1613-1645). Tsar Aleksei (1645-1676) accelerated the reform of the Muscovite army along European lines. Between 1651 and 1663, the percentage of troops in new-formation regiments rose from 7 to 79 percent.1918 Peter I used the reorganization of the Russian army that had already occurred, although in order to battle the army of Charles XII (1697-1718), he ordered large numbers of dragoon regiments to be recruited, most of which were disbanded after 1725. Yet, even after Russia's victory over Sweden in the Great Northern War, the European perception of Russia as a secondary military power had not changed. Only in the second half of the eighteenth century can we speak of Russia's becoming a major player in European politics. In 1760, a Russian army, led by General GotlibGenrikh Totleben, occupied Berlin, and in 1799 a Russian army, led by General A. S. Suvorov, was in the Alps. By 1814, Russian troops headed by Tsar Alexander I marched into Paris and a Russian governor, General Fabian Osten-Saken, was appointed there. These achievements were the result of changes that had begun in the sixteenth century as Muscovy looked increasingly to the west for military weaponry and techniques at the same time as it was beginning to expand southward along the Volga into Central Asia and eastward across Siberia, benefi tting from the economic resources gained thereby.
5. Society and economics. Northern Russia continued throughout this period to be an agriculturally labor-intensive land where seed-to-yield ratios often failed to exceed an average of 1:3, which is regarded as the minimum for subsistence. 20only a small ruling class. John LeDonne, among others, has estimated that, in the eighteenth century, the Russian nobility counted for just over 0.5 percent of the population. But the ruling order was adept at making the adjustments necessary to survive with limited resources. Russian agriculture received a boost from the cultivation of western Eurasian steppe black soil areas made possible by the introduction of the moldboard plow with coulter. As far as production is concerned, gunpowder and iron manufacture provide good examples. Guns and gunpowder, which were invented in China and brought westwards across Eurasia by the Muslims, began to be produced in large quantities in Muscovy by the early seventeenth century. Muscovy seems to have become self-suffi cient in guns and gun powder manufacture by the 1660s. By the early 1720s, Russia was exporting iron through St. Petersburg and Baltic ports, but this was primarily bar iron.2221 Russia continued to import wrought iron and steel throughout the eighteenth century. Arcadius Kahan concluded that this circumstance -indicates that the level of technical profi ciency was lower in Russian iron production than in Western European production, or that the organization of production to meet customers' demands was worse.‖ 23 Only a few iron manufacturers existed in Russia, mostly in the Urals, and they concentrated primarily on export, as did the government-owned ironworks. Kahan has argued that -the basic economic continuity between the Petrine and postPetrine periods in the manufacturing sector was not so much provided by government policy as by the existence of a ‗natural' link of an emerging distinct group of Russian manufacturers. 7. Church relations. In the second half of the seventeenth century, the Orthodox Church developed its own program of prosveshchenie (enlightenment) for raising the spiritual and moral awareness of the Russian people. Peter's reforms of the church were in accord with, and supported by, the segments of the church that backed the principles of that program of enlightenment. The Spiritual Regulation, which was in large part composed by the bishop of Pskov, Feofan Prokopovich, was signed by all the prelates and the exarch (head of the church) Stefan Iavorskii, who became president of the Most Holy Governing Synod. The Spiritual Regulation initially called the Synod an -Ecclesiastical College,‖ but the prelates changed the name to the more traditional -Most Holy Governing Synod‖ at its fi rst meeting. As Gregory Freeze has pointed out, this was not just a change in name but a signifi cant raising of the Holy Synod to the same status as the Senate. It replicated the relationship between the Holy Synod and the Boyar Council, of which the Senate was the continuation. Only with the upward change in status was an oberprokurator appointed to act as Peter's representative to the Holy Synod, just as he appointed one to the Senate.2827 The decisions against naming a new patriarch and for revamping the Holy Synod did not make the church a department of the state, as many have asserted.29 Instead, Freeze has provided suffi cient evidence and argued convincingly that the Holy Synod remained independent of the state. If anything, the Spiritual Regulation reduced the secular government's involvement in church matters. In Muscovy, following Byzantine practice, the head of the church and the head of the state co-presided over church councils in person and were co-responsible for the external administration of the church. After the promulgation of the Spiritual Regulation, a second-tier civil administrator represented the secular government in church matters.. 308. Culture and education. Catholic cultural infl uences entered the Rus lands through Novgorod in the late fi fteenth century and subsequently through Kiev in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Pre-Protestant and Protestant infl uences also came through these cities. Western artistic infl uences affected religious painting of the mid-sixteenth century, leading to the trial of state secretary Ivan Viskovatyi for objecting to these changes. European-style infl uences in portraiture began appearing in the early seventeenth century.31 The fi rst secular play, The Comedy of Artaxerxes, staged by Johann Gottfried Gregorius, a Lutheran pastor living in Moscow, was performed at the court of Tsar Aleksei in 1672. Ballet was introduced into Russia in the second half of the seventeenth century and Italian opera appeared during the reign of Empress Anna Ioannovna (1730-1740). Serf theaters, orchestra, actors, dancers, and artists carried much of the artistic culture in Russia into the early nineteenth century. In addition, the visual changes in the urban landscape brought about by the Russian baroque in the eighteenth century had already begun to be evident in the second half of the seventeenth century. Only in the nineteenth century, however, did Russian artistic culture become more or less integrated with that of Europe.
The Slavonic-Greco-Latin Academy opened in Moscow in 1687. Individuals such as the Ruthenians Simeon Polotskii (1629-1680) and Feofan Prokopovich (1681-1736), and the Greek Likhudes brothers, Ioannikios (d. 1717) and Sofronios (d. 1730), as well as Epifanii Slavinetskii (d. 1675) brought western and Greek learning, which had a major impact on strengthening Orthodoxy in the Russian lands. The development of printing in Slavia Orthodoxa differed from that of the Latin west as well as that of Slavia Romana. Through the eighteenth century, only about a dozen ecclesiastical books were printed, although in large print runs.3332 Whereas there are those who argue printing had no impact in Slavic Orthodox territory because it did not bring secular enlightenment, the Orthodox Church's program of prosveshchenie was a religion-based equivalent to the secular enlightenment program of the philosophes. Far from Peter's reforms diminishing the church and church infl uence in Russia, the church simply continued to spread its own enlightenment program. During the eighteenth century, the church established four theological academies and forty-six seminaries. Father, later Metropolitan, Platon (1737-1812), the tutor of the future Emperor Paul, blended the Orthodox church principles of the moral development of society with the ideals of the European Enlightenment. 34 In the nineteenth century, parish priests did far more to educate the populace than the secular government.35 Peter I set up a publishing system to report military matters and distribute decrees. But his son -Peter II,‖ as Gary Marker stated, -essentially brought the Petrine publishing system to an end.‖ The result was that, after Peter I, the percentage of titles devoted to military and state decrees dropped sharply and the percentage of titles classifi ed as belles lettres increased substantially.
Peter was a very active tsar, but one may well ask what endured from the frenzy of activity that was his reign. If one considers -Muscovy‖ static and -imperial Russia‖ dynamic, then one can easily come to believe that Peter was the causative agent of this difference. But to view -Muscovy‖ that way is a misreading and distortion of the evidence, since Muscovy underwent continuous micro-and macro-transformations. Signifi cant changes did occur under Peter I, and he seemed to be trying to increase the pace of change already occurring. He also had a very active public relations 36staff that undertook a campaign to praise his -accomplishments‖ at every step. I am not diminishing what Peter did achieve, which was indeed comparable with many other twenty-fi ve-year periods in Russian history, but I do question the extravagant claims made by the Peterphiliacs. Many of the changes he brought about did not fundamentally affect the course and speed of changes already well under way, or they were not sustained by his successors, or they failed completely. Those changes that did succeed and endure tended, as Dixon has pointed out, to be more in accord with Muscovite antecedents than those that did not. 37At the end of Peter's reign, the governmental administration was in chaos. When Peter came to the throne, the Boyar Council acted as a council of state and the administration was organized around the prikaz system. Peter replaced the Boyar Council with the Senate and the prikazes with colleges, based on the Swedish model. But these institutions, no matter what Peter's intent, tended to function (when they did function) similar to the way their predecessors had because that is what the administrators were familiar with. As Claes Peterson has concluded, Peter's reforms resulted in confusion for the following reasons: lack of a clear administrative blueprint; the ever-changing needs of war; confl icting advice and poor coordination; the lack of experienced, hardworking, and honest personnel; widespread corruption among public offi cials; and frequent interference by Peter and his immediate associates. Peter's -vision,‖ insofar as there was one, was little understood by the Russian governmental personnel of the time, the very ones who were supposed to implement it. The traditional outlook and way of doing things among the elite-marriage politics and the dynastic state-remained intact. Perhaps more enduring than the changes that Peter wrought personally was his value as a symbol to justify changes made by his successors, Elizabeth Petrovna and Catherine II. The reforms they undertook in his name were often not the reforms he had proposed, but they tended to have more lasting consequences.
Finally, when historians discuss the changes that Peter wrought, they are usually referring only to changes that affected the ruling elite, not even all the ruling class, and these changes scarcely had an impact on the great mass of the Russian population. Study of elites is a worthwhile and fundamental part of historical study, but we do need to be careful in extrapolating from what the elites were doing to what the rest of the population-the merchants, artisans, craftsmen, peasants and serfs, and other groups-were doing. In that respect the vertical continuities of development and change in Russian history from 1450 to 1800 are even more evident. When one puts those developments and changes in the context of the cross-currents of Afro-Eurasian infl uence fl ows for the fi rst two millennia AD and, in the spirit of Fletcher's -integrative history,‖ takes a view 36. Dixon, Modernisation, 6: -relied on well-tried Muscovite methods.‖ 37. Claes Peterson adds that Peter's model, the Swedish administrative system, did not fi t Russian conditions. Claes Peterson, Peter the Great's Administrative and Judicial of the historical landscape from the window of an airplane fl ying overhead, then the horizontal continuities become evident as well. Just as the later Rus principalities took what they needed from the Mongol/ Tatars in the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries, so too did early modern Russia take what it needed from Europe. But, just as borrowing from the Mongols did not make the Russians Mongol, borrowing from Europe did not make them European either. Russia has been its own civilization, a core culture, unique yet fundamentally interconnected with the rest of the world, and the changes it has undergone have had these same characteristics. The evolution of a Russian culture, the establishment of a Russian state, and its expansion into a Eurasian empire are all part of one of the most amazing transformations in world history, but it most defi nitely did not begin with Peter I. 
